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Large earthquakes (and secondary hazards such as aftershocks, tsunamis and 
earthquake-triggered landslides) continue to cause some of the most devastating 
humanitarian disasters, yet they remain poorly understood by humanitarian 
organisations. This is partly because of the unique features of major earthquakes 
compared to other disasters (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies , 2012). They are unpredictable, low-frequency, high-impact events with 
little or no warning and very rapid onset. Some level of preparedness and disaster 
risk reduction is possible in at-risk areas (risk mapping and targeted mitigation, 
awareness-building, modification of building codes and logistical response capacities, 
  
for example) (Concern Worldwide, 2015 ), but decision-making in the response 
phase immediately after a major earthquake has often been reactive and ad hoc, 
rather than evidence-based and strategic.  
 
While the timing of earthquakes cannot be predicted, they are not random. Areas 
prone to earthquakes are well known, and the science of determining stress build-up 
along fault lines is well-understood. Scientific approaches are also being developed 
that can forecast the intensity and spatial distribution of aftershocks. This paper 
reports on a collaboration between scientists from the University of Edinburgh 
School of Geosciences and Concern Worldwide1 to integrate this work into 
humanitarian planning, preparedness and response decision-making processes. We 
are also developing a training and support programme for humanitarian workers on 
how to interpret the forecasts and use them in emergency situations. This paper 
outlines the main features of the approach and describes the lessons from Concern’s 
use of a prototype during its emergency response to the earthquake in Nepal in April 
2015.  
 
Aftershock forecasting for humanitarian emergency planning and response  
The aftershock forecasting techniques used in this work are based on analysis of 
online earthquake catalogues, which record the time, location and size of 
earthquakes worldwide (for example USGS, 2016). In the days immediately following 
an initial earthquake, the way in which the aftershock rate decays is carefully 
monitored and extrapolated to indicate the number of events that might be 
expected over defined future periods. At the same time, the distribution of event 
size is monitored to forecast the number of large events that might be expected 
given the distribution of small events. An example of the resulting forecast is 
presented in Table 1.  
 
                                                          
1 Funded by the UK Natural Environmental Research Council (NERC) under its Probability and 
Uncertainty in Risk Estimation (PURE) programme for the project Aftershock Forecasting Tool for 
Emergency Response (AFTER).  
  
 
n = 10 
M 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 
p 0.791 0.439 0.192 0.076 0.029 0.011 0.004 0.001 0.001 
worst 1.000 0.826 0.409 0.172 0.068 0.026 0.010 0.004 0.001 
 
n = 20 
M 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 
p 0.948 0.664 0.331 0.138 0.053 0.020 0.007 0.003 0.001 
worst 1.000 1.000 0.673 0.308 0.125 0.049 0.019 0.007 0.003 
 
n = 30 
M 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 
p 0.985 0.788 0.436 0.190 0.075 0.028 0.011 0.004 0.001 
worst 1.000 1.000 0.849 0.419 0.176 0.069 0.027 0.010 0.004 
 
Table 1: Probability of an event exceeding a given magnitude. For each forecast period, n days 
(leftmost column), the top row gives the magnitude (M), the second gives the best estimate of the 
probability (p) that an event of that size will happen in this time, and the third gives a worst case 
estimate which includes an estimate of the uncertainty in the modelling and the data. This table can 
be calculated automatically in near-real-time as the sequence unfolds. 
 
The technical information contained in this table requires some explanation. 
Consider the forecasts for the 30-day time period. Under the 5.0 magnitude (M) we 
see the figures 0.788 and 1.000. These figures mean that the best guess is that there 
is nearly an 80% (p=0.788) chance of a magnitude 5 or greater aftershock during the 
next 30 days, and an event of this size would have to be considered almost inevitable 
when we include the worst case uncertainty in the forecast (p=1.000). In addition, 
the persistence of aftershock activity can be used to make a first-order estimate of 
those geographic areas most likely to experience future activity. A plot of the 
number of events being experienced per unit time in a given area shows those 
regions which are most active and which are, consequently, most likely to experience 
future aftershocks (see Figure 1). 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Earthquake density plot for Nepal on 11 May 2015. The method relies on the 
persistence of the density of aftershocks in time, which was strong in the Nepal case. A star 
marks the location of Kathmandu.  
 
The forecasts for the Nepal 2015 earthquake were produced in real time by the 
University of Edinburgh team, who also gave one-to-one email support to Concern 
staff. In addition, a number of workshops were run prior to the earthquake to 
develop an understanding of earthquake science and forecasts within Concern’s 
emergency team, refine the format and content of the aftershock report template 
and work through a number of scenarios to draw out possible implications for 
humanitarian practice. The quality of the forecasts and approach was assured by 
academic peer review and scrutinised by an international panel of geoscientists and 
humanitarian experts in January 2016.  
 
The April 2015 earthquake: aftershocks, forecasts and the humanitarian response  
The magnitude 7.8 earthquake in Nepal occurred on Saturday 25 April 2015. The 
epicentre was to the north-west of Kathmandu in Gorkha District; an estimated that 
8,000 people were killed, 20,000 injured and hundreds of thousands more made 
  
homeless. By Tuesday 28 April, Concern Worldwide had a team of five international 
staff in Nepal. A needs assessment was conducted and the decision made to focus 
distribution efforts on the badly hit Sindhupalchowk, Dolakha and Sindhuli districts, 
with the main effort concentrated on Dolakha. The University of Edinburgh team 
began the process of operational forecasting on 26 April, and was satisfied with the 
quality of the forecasts by the first few days of May. 
  
In the initial phase of the emergency, the press carried repeated reports of the 
possibility of a ‘second’ earthquake of more than a magnitude eight (M>8). Scientists 
had identified an area to the west of Kathmandu which was constantly being loaded 
with stress because of plate motion, but which had not experienced a big earthquake 
for more than 400 years. The apparent threat of this second event was picked up by 
humanitarian agencies and, on 5 May, Concern staff received a briefing from OCHA 
which indicated that there was a ‘50% chance of another earthquake occurring in the 
following weeks’. At this time humanitarian staff on the ground were experiencing 
hundreds of aftershocks, so the idea of a ‘second’ earthquake was confusing: it 
seemed to suggest that this earthquake would be a special event and that, therefore, 
the ‘normal’ aftershocks were not the danger. The Concern team was deployed in 
Dolakha Region, some 170km east of Kathmandu, where they faced the question 
whether they were in danger from this future event. They immediately forwarded 
the OCHA report to the scientists who were monitoring seismicity. 
 
The first report from the University of Edinburgh team was emailed to Concern staff 
on 7 May. It forecast that, when the uncertainty in the estimate was considered, the 
worst-case probability of an aftershock of magnitude greater than M7.5 was around 
20%.2 It also pointed out, in contrast to the ‘second’ earthquake theory, that since 
                                                          
2 Excerpt from message of 7 May 2015 from the Edinburgh team to Concern in response to the 
circular from OCHA: ‘At the minute the best we can say is as of this morning our best estimate of the 
probability of a 7.5 within 29 days (not ‘… in the following weeks …’) of the original earthquake is 
about 0.1 with an uncertainty (assuming a few technical things) of about 0.1. So worst case about 1 in 
5. An earthquake bigger than the original 7.8 has a much lower probability. NB. This does not include 
the very small probability of the triggering of a big event just along the same fault which gave the 
mainshock but the science suggesting this is incomplete, weak, unquantifiable and not ready for use. I 
do not think it alters these basic sums much.’ 
 
  
recent seismicity was concentrated in Dolakha Region, this was the most likely place 
for future large events, rather than west of Kathmandu (Figure 1). Because this 
information came directly from a trusted source, it helped clarify the confusing 
situation for the Concern team on the ground. It was used to reinforce awareness of 
the continued risk of further large aftershocks in the area in which they were 
working. This was vital as, within a week of the main shock, members of the 
population were beginning to re-enter buildings, and in some instances being 
encouraged to do so by staff from other NGOs.  
On 12 May, 18 days after the main shock, an aftershock of M7.3 hit Dolakha to the 
north-east of Kathmandu, causing considerable additional damage to buildings. In 
some areas, 98% of buildings were destroyed, many that had survived the main 
shock collapsed and there were more than 200 new fatalities and 2,500 people 
injured. At this point, 12 Concern staff and 45 partner staff members were deployed 
in the region. There were no casualties among staff, but landslides temporarily 
trapped five relief trucks, and two staff working in communities were also stranded. 
This event was entirely consistent with the high probability of an M7.5 aftershock 
presented in the 7 May report and the accuracy of the forecast further galvanised 
the Concern team around the aftershock issue.  
 
An updated report on 14 May confirmed that Concern were still working in the area 
of maximum seismic activity and concentrating their response in the right areas. Had 
the University of Edinburgh team’s research indicated that the focus of seismic 
activity had shifted to other regions, Concern would have considered undertaking an 
awareness-raising campaign at the very least in these new localities, urging people to 
stay outdoors while the risks of further damaging earthquakes remained high. The 
scientific basis of the forecasts meant that the Concern team could talk publically 
about this risk to other NGOs and local partners, whereas previously they had been 
reluctant to do so in case what they said was wrong. The team also produced revised 
safety and security guidelines that included the most recent forecast material and 
incorporated this into briefings for all new staff. Rather than being ‘at the mercy of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
  
events’, discussions were held about the level of future risk, and mitigation measures 
were put in place.  
 
Conclusion: towards mainstreaming aftershock forecasts for humanitarian 
decision-making  
The complex and fast-moving situation in Nepal in 2015 would have been familiar to 
anyone who has been involved in similar humanitarian emergencies. Despite these 
challenges, we maintain that the project led to new knowledge and understanding 
around aftershock risk, and supported more effective, confident and credible 
evidence-led decisions and practice. In particular, in accurately forecasting the high 
probability of a second large event focused on the Dolakha Region, it informed 
aspects of Concern’s emergency response in valuable ways. The forecasts will 
continue to inform Concern’s ongoing disaster risk reduction (DRR) work in Nepal. 
Unfortunately, for some in science and government, there is a belief that the 
possibility of a ‘second’ large earthquake was realised on 12 May with the M7.3 
aftershock, and consequently that the threat of a large earthquake in the future has 
receded. However, an understanding of earthquake science shows that giant, 
destructive events will still happen in Nepal, and that the Dolakha earthquake, 
shown clearly to have been an aftershock of the initial Gorkha event, does not 
reduce this possibility. The threat of a large M>8.0 earthquake in Nepal remains and 
must be included in future prevention, mitigation and preparedness planning.  
 
There are two key challenges in moving this approach beyond the pilot stage to 
wider adoption within the humanitarian sector: organisational capacity and data 
quality. The success of the initiative was highly dependent on the expertise of a small 
number of people. The underpinning science is complex and takes skill, time and 
effort to produce. As is clear from the details contained, for example, in the 7 May 
message from the University of Edinburgh team to Concern, significant training is 
required before humanitarian staff are able to understand the science and apply it 
  
proficiently. To replicate this level of skill and knowledge at scale will require the 
commitment of resources from both the science and humanitarian communities.3 
The second key challenge is data quality. The quality of the data provided by the 
Nepal Seismological Agency for the Nepal 2015 earthquake was better than is the 
case in many of the earthquake-prone countries in which humanitarian agencies 
operate, but much remains to be done. If this approach is to be mainstreamed, there 
needs to be innovation around real-time data collection using the rapid deployment 
of portable seismometers as part of the emergency response to a major 
earthquake.4 Wider uptake of this initiative, as with humanitarian innovation in 
general, is dependent on a twin strategy of refining, evaluating and consolidating the 
approach to consistently demonstrate its usefulness, and advocacy to address 
institutional and other barriers to adoption (Obrecht, 2016).  
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